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The moment the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Olayemi Cardoso, recently announced that Nigeria’s foreign reserves had inched to $49 billion as of February 5, 2026, the news was received with understandable enthusiasm.
He
described the development as “a very important statistic” when speaking at the
2nd National Economic Council (NEC) Conference in Abuja, while noting a 4.93
per cent increase and emphasising that Nigeria had moved from being a net
seller to a net buyer of foreign exchange. He cited improved remittance
inflows, a narrowing gap between official and parallel market exchange rates,
and greater confidence in the naira as evidence that reforms were working.
On the
surface, the numbers are reassuring. The premium between official and parallel
market rates has reportedly fallen to under 2 percent. Remittances have
improved following deliberate engagement with the diaspora. Nigerians can
increasingly rely on naira cards for international transactions. It can be said
that investors are earning positive real returns, banks are recapitalising,
equity markets are recovering, and macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth
of 3.98 per cent, a current account surplus of $3.42 billion in the third
quarter of 2025, and a reported moderation in inflation to 15.15 percent are
presented as signs of stabilisation.
So far,
beyond the celebratory headlines lies a deeper and more consequential question,
in the form of, what does the fixation on foreign reserves really tell us about
the underlying strength of the Nigerian economy?
History
and economic logic suggest that when a central bank repeatedly elevates foreign
reserves as a central achievement, it often signals that the true engines of
growth are either weak or underdeveloped. Strong reserves are not built through
declarations, press conferences, or defensive monetary manoeuvres. They are
built through systems that generate value, exports, productivity, and trust.
Countries with durable reserve positions did not chase reserves; they built
economies that produced them naturally.
This
distinction matters greatly for Nigeria.
Foreign
reserves are important, but they are not a development strategy. They are a
buffer, not a foundation. They are an outcome of economic vitality, not a
substitute for it. When reserves become the centrepiece of economic
storytelling, there is a risk that policymakers mistake statistical comfort for
structural strength.
Even
Nigeria’s celebrated $49 billion reserve figure requires closer scrutiny, which
appears to be more of sexing up the figures. Gross reserves make headlines, but
net usable reserves are what protect a currency in moments of stress. A
significant portion of reported reserves is often tied up in swaps, forward
commitments, and external obligations. When these are stripped out, the net
buffer available to defend the naira is far smaller than the headline figure
suggests. The gap between gross and net reserves is too large to justify
unqualified confidence about currency stability, especially in an economy that
remains import-dependent and structurally fragile.
The danger
of over-fixating on reserves is not unique to Nigeria, but it is particularly
acute here because of the economy’s narrow production base, which subliminally
calls for sexing up the figures. Despite decision-makers prematurely
applauding the reserves' growth, the apex bank must rethink its approach. The
reserves are not generated through production-based or stronger export means
but rather largely from borrowing (sales of Eurobonds) or through government
loans, which come in as dollars to the CBN that temporarily boost dollar
inflows. This points to the fact that Nigeria still exports little
beyond crude oil, imports most manufactured goods, and relies heavily on
volatile capital inflows. In such a context, reserves require constant defence
rather than organic replenishment. Tight monetary policy, FX restrictions, and
moral persuasion may buy time, but they do not solve the underlying problem of
insufficient foreign exchange generation.
By
contrast, countries with strong reserve positions followed a very different
path. Unlike Nigeria, countries like Saudi Arabia, with foreign reserves of
about $410 billion, paired subsidy reforms with visible reinvestment in
infrastructure, social welfare, and alternative energy systems. Indonesia, with
reserves of roughly $153 billion, combined fiscal reforms with expanded social
assistance and a shift toward targeted household support, ensuring that reform
pain was offset by tangible benefits. Reserves are mainly meant to grow from
productive economic activities like Singapore, whose reserves stood at
approximately $397 billion at the end of 2025, as it built its position through
decades of disciplined industrial policy, export competitiveness, domestic
savings, and institutional credibility. In all these cases, reserves were not
the objective; they were the by-product of deliberate economic architecture.
In most
successful developmental states, public expenditure plays a catalytic role in
growth. Unlike Nigeria’s, most countries' expenditures It crowds in private
investment, expand infrastructure, lower transaction costs, and build
productive capacity. Over time, this deepens domestic capital formation, drives
industrial productivity, supports export diversification, and strengthens
external balances. Nigeria’s recent experience, however, appears to
diverge from this model.
Rather
than deploying fiscal policy aggressively to stimulate productive capacity,
government financing has increasingly leaned on the domestic capital market.
While this approach has attracted foreign capital inflows, much of this capital
has been short-term portfolio investment into treasury bills, government bonds,
and money market instruments. A fact that is well established is that these
inflows can temporarily stabilise liquidity and support the exchange rate, but
their multiplier effects on the real economy are minimal. In the absence of
strong productive investment for a country like Nigeria, the giant of Africa,
this pattern resembles constructing a skyscraper on weak foundations, which is
impressive in appearance, but structurally fragile.
This
fragility is evident in the broader economy. Especially this kind of growth is
associated with Nigeria in 2025, which portrays a country that is increasingly
survival-led rather than productivity-driven. The underlying challenge today is
that households, small businesses and even industrial firms are left with no
option but to adapt to rising costs and shrinking real incomes by expanding
low-productivity activities. Industrial depth remains shallow. Domestic capital
accumulation is weak. Export capability outside oil is limited. Labour
productivity continues to lag. These are not the conditions under which
reserves become self-sustaining.
This is
why the central bank’s strategic focus must extend far beyond reserve
accumulation. If the CBN genuinely seeks to grow the economy and build reserves
sustainably, it must prioritise the mechanisms that generate foreign exchange
organically. The most important of these is productive credit expansion.
Central banks around the world are expected to shape economies not only through
interest rates but through the direction of credit. Prolonged monetary
tightness may suppress inflation at the margins, but it also suppresses
investment, output, and employment, as is the case in Nigeria. Contrary to
Nigeria’s lived experience, countries that successfully built reserves
deliberately channeled affordable, long-term credit to manufacturing,
agro-processing, and export-oriented sectors, but the same cannot be said of
Nigeria. Nigeria cannot tighten its way into prosperity.
Closely
linked to this is the need for a serious export-led industrial strategy.
Nigeria’s trade challenge is often framed as an import problem, but it is
fundamentally an export deficiency. Banning imports or rationing foreign
exchange does not create competitiveness. Export growth does. Sustainable
reserves come from selling more to the world than one buys, particularly in
manufactured goods and tradable services. Oil exports may still matter, but
they are volatile and finite. Value-added exports are repeatable, scalable, and
employment-intensive.
Exchange
rate stability, too, must be approached through supply rather than fear.
Currency pressure reflects insufficient FX supply more than excessive demand.
Strengthening real economic fundamentals, which calls for expanding non-oil
exports, formalising remittance channels, and attracting long-term productive
capital, will do more to stabilise the naira than administrative controls mixed
with sexing up figures. Predictability matters, and for this reason, investors
may tolerate risk, but they may be forced to withdraw when policies are
inconsistent.
Infrastructure
financing is another critical missing link. No economy exports competitively
without reliable power, efficient transport, and functional logistics. While
infrastructure is often treated as a purely fiscal responsibility, central
banks in many emerging economies have played catalytic roles in financing
industrial infrastructure. Supporting industrial parks, logistics hubs,
processing zones, and energy projects would address one of the root causes of
Nigeria’s weak export performance and fragile reserves.
Equally
important is the mobilisation of domestic savings. Strong reserves are easier
to build when a country funds its development internally. One of its domestic
savings that has been lying fallow is that Nigeria’s pension and insurance
funds remain under-deployed in productive sectors. For a country that is truly
angling for growth and with the right regulatory frameworks, these long-term
pools of capital can support infrastructure, manufacturing, and export
industries, reducing dependence on volatile foreign inflows.
Inflation
control must also be re-examined. This is one grey area with Nigeria’s system
as its inflation is largely cost-driven, fueled by energy costs, logistics
bottlenecks, FX shortages and insecurity. It must be understood that addressing
it solely through interest rate hikes risks shrinking output in terms of
economic production and growth while prices remain elevated, as is the case
today. The policy-makers in Nigeria must understand that supply-side
interventions that reduce production costs and stabilise input availability are
more likely to deliver durable price stability and stronger reserves than
monetary tightening, especially in the case of raising interest rates alone.
The CBN
has projected that GDP growth could reach 4.49 percent, inflation could
moderate to 12.9 percent, and reserves could exceed $50 billion. These
projections are presented as evidence of consolidation. Yet many economists
caution that macroeconomic stability, while necessary, is not synonymous with
sustainable growth. Even if the provided official statistics may suggest that
the economy is improving, the reality is that the majority of the populace are
not experiencing the benefits, as is the case in Nigeria, where the
unemployment rate is high, wages aren’t keeping up with costs and many
households are barely making ends meet.
To further
drive the point, Gbenga Olawepo-Hashim has argued that the true measure of
economic performance is not headline figures but the living conditions of
citizens. This is to say that economic growth is meaningless if it doesn’t
create jobs, purchasing power, and opportunity, cannot sustain political or
social stability, nor can foreign reserves grow sustainably.
Going
forward, it is advisable that the foreign reserves, therefore, should be read
for what they are, as a reflection of deeper economic health. When production
expands, exports diversify, infrastructure improves, capital deepens, and trust
is restored, reserves grow quietly and sustainably. When these foundations are
weak, reserves require constant defense and loud celebration.
Today,
Nigeria is at a critical point where it must make a major decision, either the
choice is between managing reserves endlessly or building an economy that earns
them effortlessly. The former offers headlines and is unsustainable. The latter
offers prosperity, and it is sustainable in the long term.
Blaise, a
journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: blaise.udunze@gmail.com,

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